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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
missioners' power to examine independent nominating petitions to determine
whether the required number of qualified voters have affixed their signatures
thereto 4 0 is reviewable under the summary jurisdiction of Section 330, and also
reviewable in a proceeding initiated under Article 78. Thus, mandamus can
be directed to the Commissioners of Election, since their power of examination
of independent nominating petitions has been held to be ministerial, 41 and
mandamus will issue to compel such ministerial acts. 2
The Court, however, affirmed the denial of the relief sought because the
same factual determination controlled in either a Section 330 or Article 78
proceeding. The lower court had found that the petitions had not been
validly signed by a sufficient number of qualified voters as required by Section
138 of the Election Law.43 Therefore, the appellants had failed to show a clear
legal right to the relief sought44 and the invalidation of the nominating petitions was proper.
TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING
Proceedings to review actions by administrative agencies must be commenced within four months after the matter to be reviewed becomes final and
binding on the petitioner. 45 It has been held that such action does not become
final and binding until the petitioner has received notice that he is aggrieved by
the agency's action. 40
In O'Neill v. Schechter4T the Court faced the problem of when examinees
in a civil service examination for patrolmen had such notice of the official
key answers as to commence the four month period for challenging the answers.
Petitioners brought this action seven months after the publication of the official
answers. They claimed that they did not have notice that they were aggreived
until they were allowed access to their own answer papers and that this action
was started within four months of that time. In opposition, the respondent
commission argued that statements contained on the examination paper informed petitioners of the necessity for making copies of their answers to enable
them to challenge the official answers. 48
The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the petition by the Special
40.

See N.Y. Enxcnox LAW § 138.

41. Wicksel v. Cohen, 262 N.Y. 446, 187 N.E. 634 (1933).
42. Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938); Schaffner v. Dooling, 258
App. Div. 735, 14 N.Y.S.2d 911 (2d Dep't 1939).
43. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 138.
44. Combs v. Edwards, 280 N.Y. 361, 21 N.E.2d 353 (1939); Leitner v. New
York Telephone Co., 277 N.Y. 180, 13 N.E.2d 763 (1938).
45. N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. ACT § 1286.
46. Adamson v. Comm'r of Educ., 1 A.D.2d 366, 370, 371, 150 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276
(3d Dep't 1956) and cases cited therein.
47. 5 N.Y.2d 548, 186 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
48. The examination made reference to copying answers at two places. The first
page contained the statement "you may, for future reference, make a record of your
answers in the question booklet and take the question booklet with you." The last page
contained five paragraphs of directions for protesting answers. These instructions, however,
were preceded by instructions implying that the protest instructions could be read after
leaving the examination.
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Term, 49 which had been affirmed by the Appellate Division.50 The majority (5)
held that the statements on the examination when viewed in the light of the
circumstances and excitement surrounding the examination did not sufficiently
appraise the petitioners of the necessity of copying their answers. For this
reason it held that the petitioners did not have notice that they were aggrieved
until they were allowed access to their papers.
The right of examinees to challenge as arbitrary answers promulgated as
correct by an administrative agency has been upheld. 51 Until this case the
statute of limitations pertinent to such challenges has been held to run from
the official publication of the answers. 52 The minority in the Court of Appeals
(2) felt that the examination paper contained sufficient notice of the need for
copying answers and for that reason this case presented no grounds for departing from the established rule.
Since the official answers promulgated by the respondent were merely the
letter answers to the examination questions, the petitioners could not know that
they were aggrieved until they compared the official answers with their own
answers. If the right to challenge arbitrary action on the part of administrative agencies is to be more than illusionary, the short statute of limitations
provided by Article 78 should be tolled until an aggrieved party has real notice
that he is aggrieved. 53 The holding of this case tends to promote such a result.
BRING ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING BARS ACTION FOR DAmAGES
In an action to recover back salary in Austin v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 54 the Board of Higher Education appealed from
an order of the Appellate Division, which reversed, on the law, the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the complaint.
Plaintiffs, six discharged members of the staff of defendant Board, commenced an action at law to recover damages allegedly resulting from their
wrongful dismissal. All of the aggrieved parties were summarily discharged,
without a hearing, after they had claimed their Fifth-Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, during a United States Senate investigation. The
Board defended upon the ground that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was in an
Article 78 proceeding governed by a four-month statute of limitations, and
that plaintiffs were precluded from commencing action under Article 78, since
this period had elapsed. Plaintiffs had never sought reinstatement through
an Article 78 proceeding, but entered into a stipulation with the Board whereby
FAILURE TO

49. 12 Misc. 2d 67, 173 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
50. 6 A.D.2d 781, 175 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1st Dep't 1958).
51. Gruner v. McNamara, 298 N.Y. 395, 83 N.E.2d 850 (1949); Fink v. Finnigan,
270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E.2d 462 (1936).
52. Lennox v. McNamara, 16 Misc. 2d 9, 99 N.Y.S.2d 867, aff'd 275 App. Div.
1023, 91 N.Y.S.2d 826 motion for leave to appeal denied 276 App. Div. 757, 92 N.Y.S.2d
918 (1st Dep't 1949); Robinson v. McNamara, 16 Misc. 2d 10, 99 N.Y.S.2d 840, aff'd
275 App. Div. 918, 90 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1st Dep't 1940); Goldberg v. Municipal Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 16 Misc. 2d 11, 128 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
53. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT art. 78.
54. 5 N.Y.2d 430, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
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